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[PREZI 1 – 4]: ON THE BOOK 
 
• The primary task of the book is to provide a detailed, critical, and 
comparative analysis of the intellectual genealogy (and geography) 
of various forms of “modernist” and “progressive” Buddhism that 
emerged during the five decades leading up to the Pacific War—
including the implications of such for postwar and contemporary 
Buddhism in Japan and beyond. A secondary goal is to bring some 
light to the grey and underexposed areas that lie within and between 
various conceptions and manifestations of “progress,” “reform” and 
“modernity” in the formative period of modern Japanese Buddhism.  
 
• I employ the term progressive to refer to a person or group that: a) is 
concerned with broad-based social welfare; b) believes that society 
can and should be refashioned along lines that will enhance social, 
political and economic equality; and c) is engaged in sustained “criti-
cal engagement” with prevailing ideological structures.1 This second 
and third aspect correlate with what has elsewhere been called the 
“threshold of modernity”; i.e., the point at which it is recognized that 
the order of society is not natural or ordained, but is rather the prod-
uct of social, historical and economic forces. Once this cognitive leap 
is made, it is a short step to the possibility of a reflexive transforma-
tion of society via human agency.2 And this is where utopian think-
ing comes into play.3 
 
[PREZI 5]: GENEALOGY OF “PROGRESSIVE BUDDHISM” 
 
• One of the most significant outcomes of the broader Meiji Buddhist 
Enlightenment was the appearance of numerous lay Buddhist asso-
ciations and publications—i.e., varieties of non-institutional Bud-
dhist activism.4 According to Yasutomi Shin’ya, these movements 
can be grouped under three broad categories: 1) Buddhism for the 
state; 2) Buddhism for society; and c) Buddhism of the self.5  Nu
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2 
• I would like to suggest a fourth possibility that arose in the late 
Meiji and Taishō periods, largely as a result of the influence of Rus-
sian writer Leo Tolstoy: ‘Buddhism for nature.’ In this paper, I pre-
sent the little-known case of Eto Tekirei, whose utopian experiment 
Hyakushō Aidōjō—the Farmer’s Institute (or Meditation Hall) of 
Love—sought to provide a comprehensive alternative lifestyle 
rooted in a Tolstoyan, agrarian ethics but also heavily inflected by 
Buddhist ideals—particularly those of Zen.  
 
[PREZI 6–10]: TAISHŌ TRENDS 
 
[PREZI 11]: TOLSTOY IN JAPAN 
 
• Tolstoy’s ideas on the individual, religion, society and politics were 
of immense influence on the “young men of Meiji”—the generation 
coming of age in the last decade of the Meiji period. Tolstoy appreci-
ated Asian culture, dabbled in Buddhism, and denounced Western 
imperialism and colonialism, urging non-Western peoples to resist 
(non-violently) becoming slaves or puppets to the West and its ide-
als, and instructing them to go “back to the land.”6 Although Tolstoy 
and his followers are often labelled “antimodern,” this is a mistake, 
based on a simplistic conflation of “modernity” and urban culture. 
Like Kiyozawa Manshi, his work contains aspects that are distinctly 
“modern” (or “modernist)”—including a rationalist interpretation of 
religion and (proto-existentialist) focus on the individual. 
 
[PREZI 12–13]: TOLSTOY’S APPEAL 
 
[PREZI 14]: 4 TAISHŌ “UTOPIAS”7 
 
• One of the first Japanese writers influenced by Tolstoy was Toku-
tomi Roka (1868–1927). On the way back from a pilgrimage to Jerusa-
lem, Roka visited Tolstoy’s villa in Yasnaya Polyana in 1906, and soon 
began to inject his literary works with Tolstoyan qualities of self-
introspection and a resistance to authoritarianism.8  Nu
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• In 1908, as leftwing activism grew in the wake of the Russo-Japanese 
War, Roka gave a controversial address to the Debating Society of 
the First Higher School of Tokyo entitled “The Sadness of Victory,” in 
which he evoked the emptiness felt by even the greatest generals 
upon their so-called “victories” in battle, concluding, in words that 
evoke the “conversion” of legendary Buddhist king Aśoka (304–232 
BCE) after the battle of Kalinga: “Of what value is man’s victory? The 
people search after ‘success’ or ‘distinction’, offering their very lives 
in payment. But what is success, what is distinction? These are noth-
ing more than pretty reflections shining forth from the dream of 
man’s aspirations.”9 This speech hit a chord with a number of the 
students in the audience, some of who promptly quit school to re-
turn to their native villages as narodniki.10 Roka himself would spend 
his final two decades ensconced in a Musashino forest retreat called 
Kōshun-en, living the life of a “natural man” (shinzen nin).  
 
[PREZI15–17]: HYAKUSHŌ AIDŌJŌ 
 
• Eto Tekirei was another budding intellectual and writer who got 
caught up in the Tolstoyan current. After studying law and politics at 
Tokyo Imperial University, around 1906, he abandoned his studies to 
become a farmer. Yet even this was not enough, so in 1910, with the 
assistance of Tokutomi Roka, Tekirei took up residence in the village 
of Takaido in the Musashino area just outside of Tokyo.11 Calling his 
new home Hyakushō Aidōjō, he attempted to practice the Tolstoyan 
life to the fullest, while incorporating Buddhist and Christian ele-
ments into his thought. Tekirei also borrowed heavily from the work 
of the anarchist Kropotkin,12 and was inspired by the works of Andō 
Shōeki, the Edo-period agrarian thinker and proto-communist vi-
sionary.13 In 1922, Tekirei published his Aru hyakushō no ie (The 
Houseold of a Farmer), which, coupled with Tsuchi to kokoro o ta-
gayashi tsutsu (Tilling the Soil and the Heart, 1924), serves as both 
memoir and justification for his agrarian socio-religious vision. Nu
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4 
• Citing Maruyama Masao’s remarks on the tendency towards ideo-
logical polarization during this period, Nishimura Shun’ichi argues 
that this tendency extended to Taishō agrarian thinking, as well, 
such that there emerged a “right wing” faction of thinkers dedicated 
to nōhonshugi (lit. ‘agriculture-essence-ism’) and a “left wing” or pro-
gressive faction espousing nōminjichishugi (lit. ‘farmer-autonomy-
ism’).14 Nishimura correctly places Eto among the latter, “progressive” 
group.15 And yet, given our concern here, just how reliant was Eto on 
Buddhist ideas and principles for his progressive, naturalist vision?  
 
• As noted, after a few years of the life of a farmer, Tekirei sought a 
more meaningful lifestyle. In his words, he began to have serious 
doubts about Tolstoy’s idealized views of peasant life, and resolved 
to establish a new system for living with nature, which he called ka-
shoku nōjō 家稷農乗—which we might translate as the “Wheel of 
Household Grain Farming.” In fact, the first half of this four-
character set, kashoku, is borrowed directly—and thus effectively set 
in contrast to—the traditional term shashoku 社稷, used to refer to 
the state as a tutlerary deity of grain. Here, in Tekirei’s (anti-kokutai) 
reformulation, it is the household (ie) that becomes the locus of live-
lihood, rather than the state. In addition, the final character jō is 
clearly borrowed from Buddhist tradition, where it refers to a par-
ticular “vehicle” or branch of the Dharma, one that leads effectively 
to nirvāṇa—as in the Great Vehicle (Sk. Mahāyāna; Jp. Daijō).  
 
• Tekirei goes on to divide this general concept into eight categories: 
1) farm methods (or ‘dharma’: nōhō); 2) farm organization (nōsei), 3) 
farm association (nōso), 4) farm “path,” including social and eco-
nomic standpoints (nōdō), 5) farm thought, including philosophy 
and art (nōsō), 6) farm doctrine, including culture (nōkyō), 7) farm 
spirit, including spirituality and religion (nōkon), 8) farm practice 
(nōgyō).16  
 
Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
 
  SHIELDS: One Village, One Mind?     
 
 
 
5 
• Clearly, in the spirit of late-Meiji New Buddhism, Tekirei is aiming 
for a comprehensive lifestyle structure—one that stretches (or de-
stroys) conventional boundaries of labor, philosophy, art, religion, 
society, and politics. Indeed, due to its application to all facets of or-
dinary life, he would go on to call his vision a “non-religious religion” 
(mushūkyō no shūkyō).17 The primary difference of course, between 
Tekirei and the New Buddhists is that here “nature” or the “soil” re-
places “Buddhism” as the organizing locus. And yet, while most of 
these principles may seems quite removed from traditional Buddhist 
teachings, if we recall the non-ideological discussions of “faith,” as 
well as the “pantheistic foundations” and “greater naturalism” of the 
New Buddhists, we see some remarkable parallels in the progressive 
wing of the Taishō literary-agricultural movement.  
 
• For example, the journal Aozora, founded in 1925 by Ōnishi Goichi 
and Ikeda Taneo, proclaims in its declaration of principles: 
 
[PREZI 18] AOZORA QUOTE 
 
1. As children born with the great earth as our mother and the vast sky 
as our father, we believe that we must find the foundation for our daily 
lives in the spirit of the pure farmer, and that moreover this is the very 
root of human existence.   
2. We repudiate the urban-based civilization, which continues to op-
press and trample down the people both spiritually and economically, 
and pledge instead to establish an agriculturally based civilization that 
conforms to the land. 
3. This creed is not meant to give birth to yet another fixed doctrine; 
rather, we simply look to re-connect with our innate disposition to till 
the great earth and lead the natural life of the farmer.18 
 
• Compare this with the followiing passages from Sakaino Kōyō and 
Takashima Beihō, the two primary figures in the New Buddhist Fel-
lowship: Nu
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[PREZI19]: NBF QUOTES 
 
We New Buddhists wish to establish Buddhism on the basis of a pan-
theistic worldview. A pantheistic perspective shall be the foundation 
of Buddhism. Upon this foundation, the Buddhism of the future can be 
continuously improved and purified. This is what we are calling New 
Buddhism.19 
  
Thus, with our spiritual nature, we must love the natural beauty of re-
ality (jitsuzai no fūkō). We must love the Buddha and the gods, which 
are other names for that reality. To put it in modern terms, facing to-
wards the natural beauty of reality we must implement a greater natu-
ralism. By using our knowledge and our faith, we must satisfy the hun-
ger and thirst of our divine nature. While human beings cannot live 
without bread, they also cannot live by bread alone. This harmony be-
tween spirit and flesh is the foundation on which human life can be-
gin.20 
 
• While the agrarian fixation is clearly stonger in Aozora than with 
the New Buddhists, there is affinity with regard to: a) the emphasis 
on reaching beyond “civilization” towards some deeper—natural—
foundation for human existence; 2) the desire to be “non-partisan” 
and “post-ideological”—without thereby losing the capacity to en-
gage in forthright criticism.  
 
• And while we might find parallels with right-leaning evocations of a 
“return to the soil” in the work of Katō Kanji and other advocates of 
nōhonshugi, here—as with the NBF—there is a noticeable lack of 
mention of the state or kokutai. In short, at issue is the individual’s 
relations with a) nature, b) themselves, and c) their society or com-
munity. In similar fashion, Eto Tekirei was fiercely resistant to the 
notion—promoted by, for instance, nōhonshugi activist Yamazaki 
Nobuyoshi, that “going back to the land” must become systemized as 
a matter of “national policy.”21  
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• Tekirei also borrowed heavily from the work of Dōgen, taking par-
ticular note of the Sōtō Zen master’s emphasis on the bodily basis of 
awakening, as expressed in the well-known phrase: “To gain the way 
you must first master your body.” As Wada Kōsaku explains, this be-
came the basis of Tekirei’s idea of “practice” (gyō).22 Elsewhere he 
writes that while he never practiced shikantaza in a meditation hall, 
he did so in the “heaven and earth meditation hall” (tenchi zendō)—
i.e., while engaged in the “practice” of farming.23  
 
• And with regard to the relationship between work and nature, he 
relied upon the following passage from the Devadatta chapter of the 
Lotus Sutra, describing the Budda’s reminiscences of his past life as a 
king who has renounced his throne to follower a teacher of the 
“wonderful law”: “Picking fruit, drawing water, gathering firewood, 
and preparing food, even offering my own body as a couch for him, 
feeling no weariness in body or mind. I served him for a thousand 
years, for the sake of the Dharma, diligently waiting upon him so he 
lacked nothing.”24  
 
• Once again, while the trope of the “suffering” or “self-sacrificial” ser-
vant was also put to good use by kokutai ideologues, Tekirei resisted 
the state-centric emphasis of nōhonshugi in favor of what might be 
called an “individualist”—or moderately “socialist”—quest for exis-
tential truth. In this respect, his critique of Marx is worth noting, in 
that—again like his New Buddhist predecessors—accepts the basic 
premises of the Marxist (as well as the Darwinian) critique of tradi-
tional “idealist” philosophies and religions, while resisting the 
harder-edged implications of a kind of materialism (and determin-
ism) that treats human beings simply as “matter” or as “animals.”25  
 
[PREZI 20–23]: IDEOLOGY & UTOPIA 
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• In his classic 1922 work Ideology and Utopia, German social theorist 
Karl Mannheim delineates the “utopian mentality” as that which is 
always in incongruence with the world—i.e., “oriented towards ob-
jects which do not exist in the actual situation.” At the same time, 
Mannheim distinguishes utopian incongruity from ideological incon-
gruity. Whereas ideologies may also “depart from reality” in thought, 
they do not go so far as to effect change on social life—rather, they 
are ultimately adopted or assimilated in support of the status quo.26 
 
[PREZI 24]: MANNHEIM QUOTE1 
 
In the course of history, man has occupied himself more frequently 
with objects transcending his scope of existence than with those im-
manent in his existence and, despite this, actual and concrete forms of 
social life have been built upon the basis of such “ideological” states of 
mind which were incongruent with reality. Such an incongruent orien-
tation became utopian only when in addition it tended to burst the 
bonds of the existing order.  
 
Consequently representatives of a given order have not in all cases 
taken a hostile attitude towards orientations transcending the existing 
order. Rather they have always aimed to control those situationally 
transcendent ideas and interests which are not realizable within the 
bounds of the present order, and thereby to render them socially impo-
tent, so that such ideas would be confined to a world beyond history 
and society, where they would not affect the status quo.27 
 
• In short, representative elites attempt, whenever possible, to trans-
form (or co-opt) emergent utopias into ideologies, in part by empha-
sizing situational transcendence. 28  This is a particularly effective 
strategy when it comes to religious utopias, which are frequently al-
ready rooted in transcendental motifs or aspirations.29 The challenge, 
in Mannhem’s view, is for utopias to maintain a certain measure of 
“critical distance” or resistance to assimilation—and this, he argues, 
requires that they be attuned to actual, material circumstances.30 Nu
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• With the exception of Tekirei’s Hyakushō Aidōjō, the Tolstoyan-
Buddhist experiments of late Meiji and Taishō belong to what 
Mannheim calls the liberal-humanitarian sort. 31 Unlike the early chil-
iastic type of utopian movements these are rooted less in “ecstatic-
orgiastic energies” than in “ideas.” In the liberal conception, a “for-
mal goal projected into the infinite future” functions as a “regulative 
device in mundane affairs.”32 I believe Tekirei’s experiment comes 
closer to what Mannheim calls the socialist-communist idea.  Social-
ism concurs with liberalism in rejecting “chiliastic excitement” in fa-
vor of a “recognition that latent ecstatic energies must be sublimated 
through cultural ideals,” and yet:  
 
[PREZI 25]: MANNHEIM QUOTE2 
 
[I]nsofar as the question is one of the penetration of the idea into the 
evolving process and the gradual development of the idea, the socialist 
mentality does not experience it in this spiritually sublimated form. 
We are faced here with the idea in the form of a novel substance, al-
most like a living organism which has definite conditions of existence…. 
The socialist “idea,” in its interaction with “actual” elements, operates 
not as a purely formal and transcendent priciple which regulates the 
event from the outside, but rather as a “tendency” within the matrix of 
this reality which continuously corrects itself with reference to this 
context. The concrete investigation of the interdependence of the entire 
range of events from economic to psychic and intellectual must bring to-
gether isolated observations into a functional unity against the back-
ground of a developing whole.33 
 
• It is important to note that the socialist recognition of conditioned 
existence is firmly embedded within a materialist orientation.34 In-
deed, it is precisely the awareness of the power of material phe-
nomenon to shape social structures, beliefs and ideas that divests 
these structures, ideas, and beliefs of their inevitability, opening up 
avenues for transformation at all levels.35 Nu
ma
ta 
Co
nf
ere
nc
e i
n B
ud
dh
ist
 St
ud
ies
 at
 th
e U
ni
ve
rsi
ty
 of
 H
aw
ai‘
i a
t M
ān
oa
, M
ar
ch
 20
–2
1, 
20
14
 
Vi
ole
nc
e, 
No
nv
iol
en
ce,
 an
d J
ap
an
ese
 R
eli
gio
ns
: P
as
t, 
Pr
ese
nt
, a
nd
 Fu
tu
re 
Pl
ea
se 
ac
kn
ow
led
ge
 th
e s
ou
rce
 of
 th
is 
pa
pe
r a
nd
 do
 no
t q
uo
te 
wi
th
ou
t t
he
 au
th
or
's 
pe
rm
iss
ion
    
SHIELDS: Taishō Agrarian-Buddhist Utopianism     
 
 
 
10 
 
• The quasi-Buddhist sense of conditionality—which is part and par-
cel of a deep and abiding historical consciousness—Mannheim per-
ceptively sees as an important (if often neglected) aspect of socialist 
orientation, and one that distinguishes it from both the radical 
atemporality of the chialiastic spirit (found in modern anarchism, 
especially Bakunin) and the de-historicized “idea” that undergirds 
the liberal attitude.36 
 
[PREZI 26]: CONCLUSIONS 
 
• So what does all this mean for present or future Buddhism?  
 
1) I think the tensions involved in considering the creation of a sus-
tainable, intentional community—a critical utopia—that highlights 
some combination of personal transformation, communal activity 
and nature can be highly instructive to thinking about the applica-
tion of Buddhism to twenty-first century life. 
 
2) I think it is crucial to examine the various ways in which Buddhist 
ideas—utopian or otherwise—are “co-opted” by hegemonic cultural, 
political and economic forms, whether that be Western capitalism or 
the Chinese government.  
 
3) Finally, I believe the Meiji New Buddhist Fellowship’s struggles—
and failures—to resolve the tensions of a modernistic interpretation 
of Buddhism that bridges humanist and naturalist perspectives, 
while emphasizing the social core of Buddhist practice, remain a 
subject of further study, and even, dare I say, practice.    
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Notes 
1 Of course, this requires as a bare minimum a belief that “society” exists. Though 
it probably goes without saying, Margaret Thatcher, who famously proclaimed: 
“there is no such thing as society,” falls outside the progressive camp.  
2 As Justin Ritzinger (2014) puts it, in an article on the anarchist writings of Chi-
nese Buddhist reformer Taixu (1890–1947),  “Across this threshold, society be-
comes its own product”; also see Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, 
Daedalus 129:1 (2000), pp. 2–3. 
3 Of course, whether this refashioning should be amelioristic—as most liberals 
and social democrats would have it, or revolutionary—as orthodox Marxists, an-
archists and many socialists and communists would prefer, is a matter of debate 
within the broader progressivist camp. It is also important to note that, at least in 
the context of the late 19th and early 20th century Japan, “progressives” were not 
necessarily anti-nationalistic (whatever that might imply), nor were they op-
posed to the growing call to national unity and harmony. 
4 As Kashiwahara Yūsen notes, “these movements, released from the strictures of 
institutional Buddhism, were more receptive to outside influence,” and would 
have an immense impact on the development of not only modern Japanese Bud-
dhism but by extension modern Buddhism as a whole. Kashiwahara 1990, 60; also 
see Tamamuro 1980, 340–41. 
5 Yasutomi 1996, 59. The first—and largest—of these, would include the kairitsu 
or Buddhist “restoration” figures (e.g., Fukuda Gyōkai), as well as many variations 
of Buddhist “modernism” emerging out of the work of Enlightenment figures such 
as Inoue Enryō and Shaku Sōen, both of whom sought to both strengthen the 
Dharma and protect the imperial state. The second category includes the gener-
ally progressive New Buddhist movement of the late Meiji period and later Bud-
dhist socialists such as Seno’o Girō. Finally, the third category, “Buddhism for the 
self,” has roots in the “spiritualism” of Shin sect reformer Kiyozawa Manshi, and 
emerges more fully with the “aesthetic” and “existential” Buddhism of the Kyoto 
School and D. T. Suzuki. The Tolstoyan-Buddhist intentional communities that 
flourished in the Taishō period were largely products of the third category (Bud-
dhism for the self); and this made them vulnerable to “co-optation” by the first 
(Buddhism for the state) in the early Shōwa period. By the mid-Taishō period, the 
second category (Buddhism for society), embodied by the work of the New Bud-
dhist Fellowship, had largely disappeared from Japan, as concern for “character” 
and “society” was replaced by emphasis on “personality” and “culture.”  
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6 Indeed, as Marks notes, Japanese readers of Tolstoy tended to see him as famil-
iar rather than exotic or mystical—the way he was usually seen in the West—
and for various reasons treated him as “one of their own” (Marks 2003, 124). 
7 Among the many “young men of Meiji” influenced by Tolstoy, the four I examine 
in my chapter are Itō Shōshin (1876–1963), Nishida Tenkō (1872–1968), Eto Tekirei 
(1880–1944) and Musha(no)kōji Saneatsu (1885–1976). All four men identified 
strongly with Tolstoy, not only as writers and thinkers but also in terms of adopt-
ing the master’s lifestyle and attempting to put his ideas into practice. In particu-
lar, they were attracted to what Akamatsu Katsumaro called: “the practical effec-
tiveness of Tolstoy’s doctrines of love, labor, nonresistance, and reverance for the 
agrarian way of life” (Akamatsu 1981, 98). All of them established “intentional 
commmunities” that, remarkably—with the exception of Tekirei’s—have per-
sisted until today. Finally, all four, to varying degrees and in eclectic and piece-
meal fashion, incorporated Buddhist ideas, values and/or practices into their 
utopian experiments. In this paper, in the interests of time, I will focus only on 
Tekirei, certainly the least known of the four. 
8 See Shizen to jinsei (Nature and Human Life, 1900) for Roka’s reflections on na-
ture, and Mimizu no tawagoto (Gibberish of an Earthworm, 1913) for his adoption 
of the Tolstoyan peasant lifestyle. See Shifman 1966, 68–76 for the correspon-
dence between Roka and Tolstoy.  
9 Cited (in translation) in Akamatsu 1981, 99. 
10 Akamatsu 1981, 99; also see Moiwa 1981. The Russian word narodniki refers to a 
person associated with a loosely defined progressive social movement that first 
arose in Russia in the 1860s and 1870s, in response to the poverty and social prob-
lems unleashed by of Tsar Alexander II’s “emancipation” of the serfs. The ideology 
developed and promoted by the narodniki was a form of populism, focused espe-
cially addressing the grievances of rural peasants—still the vast majority of ordi-
nary Russians—rather than urban workers. In many respects, the Russian narod-
niki movement reflected resembled the Popular Rights and Freedoms movement 
of early Meiji, albeit the Russian case would give birth to a more sophisticated 
ideology in the work of critics like Nikolay Mikhaylovsky (1852–1904), who, in-
spired by the work of Alexander Herzen (1812–1870) and Nikolay Chernyshevsky 
(1828–1889), incorporated elements of Marxist criticism into his interpretation of 
narodnichestvo. Most narodniki were suspicious of capitalism, and held and ideal-
ized view of peasants and rural life. Though the movement failed to achieve its 
aims—in large part due to its largely middle-class and urban leadership as well as 
the backlash against its successful assassination of Tsar in 1881—it influenced the 
course of Russian socialism (and anarchism) and played a significant role in so-
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cial thought and experimentation in late Meiji and Taishō Japan. For more on the 
narodniki, see Kolakowski 2005, 609–612. 
11 Musashino would become the center of the Japanese narodniki movement, with 
Tokutomi Roka, Ikeda Taneo and Onishi Goichi all spending some time in the 
Kamitakaido area during the Taishō period. See Nishimura 1992, 151. 
12 Kropotkin’s Fields, Factories and Workshops “really taught [him] how to live a 
life of labor”; Akamatsu 1981, 100; also see Eto 1925; Nishimura 1992, 170.  
13 See Nishimura 1992, 173–74. Andō—a lapsed Sōtō Zen monk who called for the 
abolition of the warrior class—was a strict rationalist and humanist whose vision was 
not bound to Confucian or Neo-Confucian moralism. Andō’s magnum opus was 
Shizen shin’eido (The True Way of Administering [Society] According to Nature, 
1753). Along with his exact contemporary Tominaga Nakamoto, Andō is one of 
those rare thinkers whose works are so far ahead of their time that the reader suspects 
forgery (see Andō 1991, 1992; Norman 1949, Yasunaga 1992, Najita 2002). Tekirei 
called his commune on the outskirts of Tokyo Tenshinkei, which is borrowed 
from Andō’s trope of the natural order as “movement,” “truthfulness,” and “rever-
ence”; see Najita 2002, 75–76.  
14 Nishimura 1992, 88 
15 Along with Shimonaka Yasaburō (1878–1961), Ishikawa Sanshirō (1876–1956), 
and Ōnishi Goichi (1898–1992)—and against “rightists” such as Gondō Seikyō 
(1868–1937, Tachibana Kōzaburō (1893–1974), Yamazaki Nobuyoshi (1873–1954) 
and Katō Kanji (1884–1967); Nishimura 1992, 89. For an analysis of the life and 
work of Katō Kanji vis-à-vis the emergence of nōhonshugi, see Havens 1970a. 
16 Nishimura 1992, 171 
17 Tekirei writes about this in his correspondence with Akegerasu Haya in the 
Buddhist journal Chugai Nippō (March–April 1916); see Wada 2012, 293–94. 
18 Cited in Nishimura 1992, 150; my translation. As Nishimura notes, the third of 
these principles is clearly borrowed from the work of American agrarian activist 
A. C. Townley (1880–1959), founder of the Non-Partisan League (150), a progres-
sive agrarian political party that had some success in the US midwest during the 
1910s. 
19 Sakaino Kōyō, Shin Bukkyō 2, 9: 325 (Sept 1901) 
20 Takashima Beihō, Shin Bukkyō 11, 3: 263 (March 1910) 
21 See Nishimura 1992, 171. 
22 Wada 2012, 12–14 
23 See Saitō et al., 2002, 232 
24  Cited in Wada 2012; Lotus Sutra, chap. 12 “Devadatta”; trans. 
http://www2.fodian.net/ world/0262_12.html 
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25 See Wada 2012, 59–64. In certain respects, Tekirei’s eclectic philosophy is 
rooted in principles similar to Kiyozawa Manshi’s seishinshugi, so it comes as no 
surprise to learn that in early 1902 the young Tekirei visited the Kōkōdō to hear 
Manshi lecture on Shinran and was favorably impressed by the older man. Two 
decades later he would write that it was due to Manshi (and his reading of Shin-
ran), that Tekirei first truly discovered the “self” (shi). He would later have contact 
with two of Manshi’s chief students: Akegarasu Haya and Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–
1941).See Wada 2012, 285–86. 
26. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 192.  
27. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 192–93, my emphasis.  
28 Though ideologies, like utopias, may be “situationally transcendent,” unlike 
utopias they are also capable of being assimilated to the social order; i.e., though 
“they often become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of 
the individual,” they “never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected 
contents. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 194. 
29 Mannheim cites the example of Christian agape or brotherly love, which, at 
least for most of Christian history, has remained a nebulous—and largely politi-
cally harmless—ideal out of reach of the social realities in which Christianity has 
actually existed. In other words, over the course of time it became an “ideology,” 
despite the fact that it may indeed—as liberation theologians argue—have origi-
nated as a “utopia.” It seems likely that Asian Buddhist tropes such as awakening, 
no-self and compassion have functioned in a similar way (as the Critical Buddhists 
would assert).  
30 Of particular note for our purposes is Mannheim’s conclusion with regard to 
the critical function of the socialist approach: “It is not sufficient [i.e., as with the 
liberal view] to have a good intention in the abstract and to postulate in the far-
off future a realized realm of freedom, the elements of which are not subject to 
control. It is necessary rather to become aware of the real conditions (in this case 
economic and social) under which such a wish-fulfilment can at all become op-
erative. The road which leads from the present to this distant goal must also be 
investigated in order to identify those forces in the contemporary process whose 
immanent, dynamic character, under our direction, leads step by step towards 
the realized idea” (241).  In short, “socialism, in its analysis of ideology, worked 
out a coherent, critical method which was, in effect, an attempt to annihilate the 
antagonists’ utopia by showing that they had their roots in the existing situation” 
(241). The socialist technique of ideology criticism is one that Mannheim em-
braces—as becomes clear, this is precisely what he means when he writes of the 
task of the sociology of knowledge itself.  And yet, in attempting to go beyond 
Marxism, Mannheim writes that socialists and communists are particularly prone Nu
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to believe that they can somehow exempt their own “scientific” analysis from his-
torical contingency and conditionality (75, 78; also see Berger). This failure to 
recognize or realize one’s own “situational determinism” (Seinsgebundenheit) of 
one’s own ideas ties directly into traditional Buddhist understandings of no-self, 
interdependence, dependent origination, and emptiness. 
31  This aligns with Harry Harootunian’s argument that Taishō period “neo-
nativist” critics were in the process of creating a counter-narrative (not necessar-
ily anti-modern) to the Meiji discourse of “bureacratic rationality” in service of 
the imperial state. While this new narrative was, like the various Tolstoyan-
Buddhist utopian experiments explored above, “critical” in the sense of present-
ing a distinctive, new, and attractive alternative means to self-expression and 
communal existence, it relied upon what Harootunian calls a form of “intransi-
tive knowledge” as an alternative to the manipulative (and vulgar) utilitarianism 
of instrumental rationality and the authoritarian rhetoric of “objective truth.” 
Here intransitive knowledge refers to: “a mode of knowing that closes the dis-
tance between knowing subject and the object of knowing because, it is believed, 
knowledge is constituted from the life and custom of the knower. As a result, 
practice and hermeneutic become one and the same things.” Harootunian 1990, 
101. 
32 In other words, utopia is quite literally an idealized “other” or “higher realm” 
that inspires us by working on or transforming our moral conscience. Impor-
tantly, this liberal-bourgeois drive towards the “middle way” is pursued through a 
privileging of ideas above the vulgar materiality of “existing reality.” As a result, 
according to Mannheim: “Elevated and detached, and at the same time sublime, 
it lost all sense for material things, as well as every real relationship with nature.” 
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 222. 
33 “In this context, ideas are not dreams and desires, imaginary imperatives 
wafted down from some absolute sphere; they have rather a concrete life of their 
own and a definite function in the total process. They die away when they be-
come outmoded, and they can be realized when the social process attains to a 
given structural situation. Without such relevance to reality, they become merely 
obfuscating ‘ideologies’…” (Mannheim 240–41; 246–47). 
34 The ‘material’ conditions which were previously regarded merely as evil obsta-
cles in the path of the idea are here hypostatized into the motor factor in world 
affairs, in the form of an economic determinism which is reinterpreted in materi-
alistic terms” (Mannheim 242). 
35 Here, I believe, Tekirei goes beyond Tolstoy, whose agrarian-socialist vision was 
arguably limited by a lingering commitment to idealist spirituality. See, for ex-Nu
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ample, Tolstoy’s letter to leading Japanese socialists associated with the Heimin-
sha in 1905, in which he criticizes socialism for its tendency towards materialism: 
“I must tell you that as for myself I do not favor socialism. I would regret it if Ja-
pan, one of the most vigorous and progressing sectors of mankind, with all her 
astuteness, should take from Europe this brittle, visionary, and essentially falla-
cious thing that is socialism. Europe herself is already abandoning socialism… 
The goals which socialism maintains (to wit, material welfare) satisfy the basest 
aspects of human nature. Such welfare can never be attained through the means 
advocated… The true well-being of man is spiritual, that is to say, moral. Within it, 
material welfare is also included. This lofty aim can only be atained through the 
successful organization of all countries and peoples into one religious and moral 
unit.” Cited (in translation) in Akamatsu 1981, 97. 
36 Mannheim 243. As Mannheim notes—with Derrida—this historical conscious-
ness is often lost within mainstream Marxism when class itself trumps history 
(and culture): “If the dynamic conception of time is cancelled out of the Marxian 
sociological method, here too is obtained a generalizing theory of ideology which, 
since it is blind to historical differentiations, would relate ideas exclusively to the 
social positions of those who hold them irrespective of the society in which they 
occur or of the particular function they may there fulfil” (Mannheim 254). 
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